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ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS TO PREVAILING
DEFENDANTS IN CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA: A DUAL STANDARD
RESTRICTING AWARDS TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS
IS NECESSARY
The general rule in American courts is that prevailing parties
are not awarded attorney's fees. There are, however, statutory and
equitable exceptions which may result in fee shifting, all of which
are applicable in class action suits.1
In the federal courts the exceptions are applied according to a
dual standard for prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.
The standard is dual in that it is a liberal one for awards to plain-
tiffs and a restrictive one for awards to defendants.' California has
not yet articulated a dual standard that distinguishes between plain-
tiffs and defendants, but historically the legislature and the courts
have favored consumers as plaintiffs'. Without a dual standard
awards may be made in many instances in which the defendant is
simply the prevailing party, with no showing of bad faith on the part
of the plaintiff. When this occurs, there is a considerable deterrent
effect on consumer class action litigation.'
In 1975, an award of attorney's fees was made to the prevailing
defendants in Seibert v. Sears." The award was granted solely on the
basis of the statutory provision for an award to a prevailing party;
there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. This
set an extraordinary precedent for class actions in California.'
© 1984 by Marie Celeste Luce.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 8-15.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 51-64.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 69, 104-106.
4. 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1975).
5. Seibert is actually a consolidation of 11 class action lawsuits brought in the superior
courts of the City and County of San Francisco and the County of Alameda, against many
major retail merchants, alleging violations of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1810.2 of the Unruh Act. The
Unruh Act, CAL. Csv. CODE § 1801-12 (Deering 1981), delineates the rights, responsibilities,
and liabilities of the parties to retail installment sales contracts. The Act became effective
January 1, 1960.
Section 1810.2 limits the amount of finance charges which may be applied to the unpaid
balance of a retail consumer's credit account. At the trial, in seven of those actions, the court
found that there had been no violation of the Unruh Act. The four remaining actions brought
in San Francisco were dismissed after demurrers were sustained without leave to amend; in
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The threat of liability for attorney's fees is a tremendous
weapon against the potential consumer class action plaintiff.' More-
over, an award made under the Seibert circumstances is not in keep-
ing with California's history of consumer rights legislation and class
action litigation.' This comment will show that standardless awards
should not be granted to prevailing defendants; instead, the federal
dual standard should be adopted. A proposal will be developed for
legislative enactment of a statutory dual standard.
I. ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING-THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS
EXCEPTIONS
To begin to understand the importance of an attorney's fee
award to a prevailing defendant, it is necessary to first understand
the "American Rule" regarding attorney's fees.' In England and
most other Western countries, attorney's fees are awarded as a mat-
ter of course to the prevailing party." By contrast, the rule in the
United States requires that each party be responsible for the
financial burdens of his own legal expenses absent either a statutory
exception, an agreement between the parties, or certain equitable cir-
cumstances.1" It is primarily in the class action arena that qualifying
equitable situations arise.
In both the federal and California courts, the developments of
the statutory and non-statutory exceptions to the no-fee rule have
those four actions, the court awarded the prevailing defendants attorney's fees pursuant to
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1811.1. On appeal, the eleven actions were consolidated and the trial
courts' decisions were affirmed in all respects.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1811.1 provides in pertinent part: "Reasonable attorney's fees and
costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party in any action on a contract or installment ac-
count subject to the provisions of this chapter regardless of whether such action is instituted by
the seller, holder or buyer."
6. It is generally accepted that fee shifting in any context is a deterrent to litigation.
Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A. J. 859 (1978). When the
possibility exists that a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorney's fees against the losing
plaintiff in a class action, there is a considerable chilling effect on public interest litigation.
This results because the litigation depends on the ability of the plaintiff to shift his costs to a
losing defendant without the concomitant risk that the plaintiff might be liable for the defen-
dant's costs in the event the plaintiff loses. Note, Prevailing Defendant Fee Awards in Civil
Rights Litigation: A Growing Threat to Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75 (1982).
7. Since the 1960's, California has enacted a great deal of consumer-oriented legislation,
and the courts have adopted a class action model patterned after FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See infra
notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Note, Attorney's Fees-Recovery by Prevailing Defendants in Title VII
Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Attorney's Fees],
supra note 6, at 75-76.
9. Note, supra note 6, at 75; Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 8, at 629.
10. See Note, supra note 6; Note, Attorney's Fees supra note 8.
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paralleled each other." The federal court developments are impor-
tant in California because of the state's judicial adoption of Rule
2312 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class action litiga-
tion." There are currently many examples of statutory exceptions
which allow attorney's fees either to the prevailing plaintiff or to the
prevailing party whether plaintiff or defendant.' 4 Additionally, there
are a few general exceptions to the no-fee rule that have arisen out
of the courts' equitable power to respond to certain types of actions.
The exceptions developed in the federal and California courts are the
common fund, substantial benefit, private attorney general, and bad
faith theories. 5
A. Common Fund Theory
The common fund theory allows recovery of fees when a plain-
tiff has created or preserved a common fund for the benefit of others
not parties to the suit.' Such a fund may consist of damages the
court has ordered to be paid by the losing defendant to the successful
class. 7 The fund may also consist of monies preserved by the plain-
tiffs when they have successfully enjoined the defendant from spend-
ing money for a particular purpose or in a particular manner.'"
The rationale behind this exception is that the party plaintiff
has taken on the burden of a suit minimally beneficial to him, but
the outcome significantly benefits a large class of individuals or the
11. See infra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
12. Implicit in the adoption of the federal model is that California Courts will use fed-
eral judicial interpretations and precedents, as well as the federal rule itself, in assessing attor-
ney's fees awards.
13. Comment, Consumer Class Actions in California: A Practical Approach to the
Problem of Notice, 7 PAC. L.J. 811 (1976).
14. See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1977) (prevailing party awarded
attorney's fees); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1981) (prevailing party
awarded attorney's fees); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1971) (plaintiff awarded
attorney's fees). For an extensive list of relevant federal statutes, see NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 7040 (1977). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717 (West 1973) (prevailing
party awarded attorney's fees if stipulated in contract); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.50 (West
1973) (credit card holder as prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 16-36.
16. C. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1803 (1972
& Supp. 1982); 4 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgment § 133 (1971); NEWBERG,
supra note 14, at § 7245; Note, supra note 6, at 85-86.
17. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Coalition for Los Angeles County
in Public Interest v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, 76 Cal. App. 3d 241 142
Cal. Rptr. 766 (1977).
18. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 244 (1976).
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general public.19 Because the unnamed beneficiaries of such a suit
would otherwise profit with no cost to themselves, fees are awarded
from that common fund.2 ° The federal and California courts freely
utilize this exception, especially in class actions.21
B. Substantial Benefit Theory
Under the substantial benefit theory, the same kind of equitable
circumstances exist as under the common fund theory, but there may
be no common fund from which to award the fees. 2 To justify fee
shifting under this theory, the court focuses on the benefit the plain-
tiff confers on all the class members in successfully litigating their
rights without their participation as parties. In the past, in order to
reimburse the prevailing class representatives, the courts have as-
sessed fees against the absent members of the class who were bene-
fited. But, this was held to violate due process rights of those absent
class members because the court does not have in personam jurisdic-
tion over them.2" The court may, however, assess fees against the
losing defendants.24
Because the award may be made when there is no identifiable
fund from which to pay the fees, the substantial benefit rationale is
used less often than the common fund rationale. This theory is em-
ployed, however, in both the federal and California courts.2"
C. Private Attorney General Theory
Closely akin to the substantial benefit theory is the private at-
torney general theory. This exception is applied when the underly-
ing action is one to enforce an important public right or public pol-
icy. The plaintiff is seen as acting in lieu of the attorney general for
19. See Note, supra note 6, at 85-86.
20. See supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16; CAL. CIV., PROC. CODE § 1021
(West 1980).
22. WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 134; see also Note, supra note 6, at 85-86.
23. Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa 1973); National Ass'n of
Farmworker Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1979); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 16.
24. Fletcher v. A. J. Industries, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968);
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16; WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 134; see also Note,
supra note 6, at 85-86.
25. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 916, 593 P.2d
200 (1979), 154 Cal. Rptr. 503; Inyo v. Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1978); Foley v. Devaney, 528 F. 2d 888 (3d. Cir. 1976); WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 134;
Note, supra note 6, at 85-86.
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the public at large and is reimbursed for expenses incurred.2" Until
the United States Supreme Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
vice Co. v. Wilderness Society,27 this exception was widely used in
federal courts. Alyeska severely limited this exception and called for
explicit statutory authorization for such an award.28 This exception
was virtually dead after the Alyeska decision, but was soon followed
by legislative response. In a variety of areas, Congress authorized fee
awards by revising existing laws and enacting new ones.29
Generally, the California court decisions, in the wake of Aly-
eska, also denied awards to the prevailing plaintiff on the basis of the
private attorney general theory.3" Soon thereafter, the California Su-
preme Court in Serrano v. Priest" affirmed a trial court decision
that such an award could be made when a constitutional issue is
litigated.3 2 Additionally, before the Serrano opinion was filed, the
California legislature codified the private attorney general theory
permitting the award of fees when there is a vindication of either a
constitutional or a statutory right.8"
D. Bad Faith Litigation Theory
At the federal court level, there is an exception for bad faith
litigation. In this instance, either party may be awarded fees when
the suit has been brought or maintained in a vexatious or oppressive
manner.34 The California courts have not yet applied this exception.
One California court recognized the bad faith exception, but chose
not to apply the exception under the circumstances of the case.35 An-
other California court held that while it recognized the need for such
an exception, it would not adopt this exception in the absence of
26. WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 134; NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 7240; Note, supra
note 6, at 87-89.
27. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
28. Id. at 262.
29. Note, supra note 6, at 89. For an exhaustive list of federal statutes authorizing fee
shifting, see NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 7040.
30. McDermott & Rothschild, Supreme Court of California 1976-1977-Foreword::
The Private Attorney General Rule and Public Interest Litigation in California, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 139-41 (1978).
31. 20 Cal. 3d 25 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
32. WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 134B.
33. Id. at § 134C.
34. NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 7240; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, at
§ 1803.
35. Inyo County v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 91-92, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71,
77 (1978).
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suitable legislation. 6
Except for the bad faith rule, all of these equitable exceptions
focus on the prevailing plaintiffs. The common fund, substantial
benefit, and private attorney general theories also presuppose a pri-
vate plaintiff enforcing a private or public right or correcting a
wrongdoing by the defendant. The bad faith exception focuses on the
misconduct of either party in bringing or pursuing litigation.
Thus, the equitable exceptions to the American no-fee rule are
primarily favorable to the plaintiff. In contrast, the defendant gener-
ally must look to one of the statutory exceptions which permit fee
shifting to a prevailing party. 7
II. CLASS ACTIONS-PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL AND CALIFOR-
NIA COURTS
Both federal and California legislation directly related to class
action litigation contain no provisions authorizing the award of attor-
ney's fees. At the federal level, class actions are authorized by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Included in the federal
rule are detailed instructions for many aspects of the class actions,
such as the prerequisites to a class action, the conditions for mainte-
nance of a class action, notice to the class members, and various or-
ders that may be made in reference to the class action. In spite of
this seemingly thorough treatment of class actions, there is no refer-
ence to attorney's fees. This issue must be determined by the appli-
cation of statutory and equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule in ac-
cordance with standards determined by the United States Supreme
Court.
In California, there are two statutes dealing with class actions.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 is a permissive stat-
ute only, allowing the use of the class action device "when the ques-
tion is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or
when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court."3 9 This section is applicable to any type of suit
and leaves the question of the award of attorney's fees to the relevant
36. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 834-35, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1976);
WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 116.
37. See, e.g., WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 128. See also Aaron, Attorney Fee Awards
for Pro Bono Lawyers, 7 LITIGATION 28 (1981); Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 8, at 28-
30.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
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statutory or equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule.4
Class actions are also authorized by California Civil Code sec-
tion 178141 for suits alleging violations of the California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act.42 The only procedural instructions in this sec-
tion are those setting the prerequisites for maintenance of a class
action. Again, no mention is made of attorney's fees within section
1781 and there are no other provisions in the Consumer Legal Rem-
edies Act which permit fee shifting.
Therefore, in all state or federal class actions, the party seeking
an award of attorney's fees must find an applicable statutory or eq-
uitable exception.4
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS WITHIN THE CLASS ACTION
CONTEXT
The lack of specific statutory direction concerning attorney's
fees in class actions necessitates looking to the federal and state statu-
tory and equitable exceptions which do provide for the award of at-
torney's fees.
Fee awards in class action suits are of much greater importance
than in the ordinary civil suit. Class action plaintiffs are often una-
ble to afford litigation, yet, they are frequently the most in need of
the protections available to the consumer.44 Often in such instances
the cost of maintaining a suit individually would be so prohibitive,
especially in comparison to the possible financial gains, that a class
action is the only viable method of pursuing a claim.45 The time-
consuming procedures unique to class action suits, however, often
result in fees that are staggering in comparison to the costs of indi-
vidual actions.46
When such enormous fees are at stake, the crucial issue is who
40. This section does not address any procedural issue. For a discussion of the statutory
and equitable exceptions, see supra text accompanying notes 8-37.
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1973).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750-1789 (West 1973).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
44. Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
45. See Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d. 808, 807-08, 484
P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971).
46. For a broad sample of the size of the fees resulting from various types of class
actions see NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 7025, 7030, and 7035. An excellent example of the
extremely time-consuming nature of class action litigation even in pre-trial stages can be seen
from the group of law suits consolidated in San Francisco Superior Court by various named
plaintiffs agait. lajor California banks. Under the file name of Rudolfi v. Bank of America,
there were o%, . volumes of pleadings and papers in the files as of summer, 1982. Rudolfi v.
Bank of Ameri: .. Civ. No. 720-308 (San Francisco Super. Ct., Dept. 3, Sept. 16 1983).
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is responsible for those fees. Without a strong possibility of repay-
ment for the attorney's time and advancement of considerable costs,
much class action litigation would simply fall by the wayside.47 No
matter how strong the motivations of the individual attorney or small
law firm or how deep the commitment to pro bono work of the large
law firm, the drain on their finances through representation of class
action clients would soon eliminate effective representations in all
but the most unusual cases. Thus, the availability of various fee
shifting arrangements presents a threshold question in the class ac-
tion suit. The development of federal and California statutory and
equitable exceptions to the American no-fee rule has kept the door
open to class action litigation.48
In the area of class action litigation, there are many examples of
the various exceptions to the no-fee rule.49 When there is an excep-
tion by statutory allowance of fees to a prevailing party, the prevail-
ing defendant has an almost equal chance of being awarded attor-
ney's fees as does the prevailing plaintiff. The class action suit,
however, is often given special consideration and is moreover the
subject of special procedural rules.5"
A. Attorney's Fees Awards in Federal Class Actions
In the federal courts, when there is a statutory fee shifting pro-
vision, prevailing class action plaintiffs are treated differently than
prevailing class action defendants. 51 The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 19765' embodied the congressional attitude
favoring the award of fees to class action plaintiffs. 3 The Act pro-
vides for reasonable attorney's fees in several types of civil rights
actions and in some tax litigation. It is typical of other statutes au-
47. McDermott & Rothschild, supra note 30.
48. See id.
49. For examples of common fund, see Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980);
Coalition for Los Angeles County in Public Interest v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles
County, 76 Cal. App. 3d 241, 142 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1977). For examples of substantial benefit,
see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d
596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976). For examples of the private attorney general theory, see
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,
569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). For an example of bad faith, see Davis v. Braniff
Airways, 468 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1781 (West 1973). For a discussion of the special importance of the dual standard see Note,
Attorney's Fees, supra note 8, at 32-39; Note, supra note 6, at 91-100.
51. See Note, supra note 6, at 91-100.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
53. Note, supra note 6, at 90 n.77, 91-93.
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thorizing attorney's fees. 4 As a response to the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Alyeska, the Act was intended to be liberally
applied to a prevailing plaintiff vindicating an important public
right.55 On the other hand, Congress intended the Act to be applied
to a prevailing defendant only when necessary to deter meritless
suits. 56
The standard for awards to prevailing plaintiffs was determined
in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises."7 The Newman court held
that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award un-
just.". This very liberal standard was preserved by Congress in its
enactment of the Awards Act and has been subsequently followed in
many court decisions.59
Aware of the great potential for abuse of the class action mecha-
nism as a means of harrassing and intimidating a defendant, Con-
gress provided for the award of attorney's fees against a plaintiff
guilty of vexatious, frivolous or harassing litigation. 0 The standard
for making such an award was enunciated in Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC.6 ' In Christiansburg, the United States Supreme
Court held that prevailing defendants should be awarded fees only
when it is shown that the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreason-
able, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective
bad faith."' 62 Although initially not accepted by all the courts, it has
since become the recognized dual standard in civil rights cases.63 In
general, the federal courts have followed Christiansburg in all class
action suits.6 4
Thus, the fee award rule in class action suits in federal courts
requires that fees be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff unless unusual
circumstances suggest it would be unjust to do so. Fees will not be
awarded however, to a prevailing defendant unless unusual circum-
stances suggest it would be unjust not to do so.
54. See id. at 89; Aaron, supra note 37, at 28.
55. Thus the private attorney general exception to the no-fee rule which Alyeska held
could not be applied absent legislative authorization. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
56. Note, supra note 6, at 91-93.
57. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
58. Id. at 402.
59. Note, supra note 6, at 87-88.
60. Id. at 95.
61. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
62. Id. at 421.
63. Note, supra note 6, at 95 n.102.
64. Note, supra note 6, at 95-100.
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B. Attorney's Fees Awards in California Class Actions
As in the federal courts, California has statutory and equitable
exceptions to the no-fee rule applicable to class actions.65 While
there are many statutory exceptions, the equitable exceptions are
limited to the common fund, substantial benefit, private attorney
general and bad faith exceptions. 6 Moreover, the California legisla-
ture has kept the door open for class action litigation by addressing
the threshold issue of financial responsibility. But, unlike Congress,
which enacted many revisions and additions to existing legislation,
the California legislature's response to the Alyeska decision was to
adopt the private attorney general theory by statute. 7 As a result,
California has very broad authorization for the allowance of attor-
ney's fees to plaintiffs in an , action affecting a consumer interest.68
In contrast to the federal courts, California has not developed a
dual standard for awards to prevailing defendants. There has been
no California case comparable to Christiansburg limiting awards to
prevailing defendants to those circumstances in which there is a
showing of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. Consequently, no
such showing is required, and there has been at least one decision in
which attorney's fees were awarded to a prevailing defendant with-
out any showing of plaintiff's bad faith.69
The 1975 court of appeals decision in Seibert v. Sears7
awarded attorney's fees to the defendant solely on the basis of Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1811.171 which authorizes fees to a prevail-
ing party. Although presented with arguments that such an award is
contrary to the spirit and intent of the Unruh Act72 on which the
65. See generally supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980). Section 1021.5 provides in perti-
nent part: Upon motion, a court may award attorney's fees to a successful party against one or
more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important
right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecu-
niary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
68. Because CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 permits the court to make discretionary
awards whenever any statutory or constitutional right is litigated, class action plaintiffs are not
dependent on specific statutory authorization in California as they are dependent on the indi-
vidual statutory exceptions in federal suits.
69. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
70. 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1975).
71. See supra note 5.
72. Appellant's Opening Brief at 86-88, Seibert v. Sears, 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1975).
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class action was based, the court ignored these equitable considera-
tions. Instead, the court looked only to the plain meaning of the stat-
utory language and awarded attorney's fees to the defendants be-
cause they were the prevailing party. 3
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS
IN CALIFORNIA CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
The history of consumer legislation and class actions in Califor-
nia shows a policy towards encouraging consumer activism and class
actions. The award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in con-
sumer class actions is contrary to that policy and creates due process
and cost allocation problems.
A. California's Consumer Rights Policy
California's courts and legislature are committed to consumer
legislation. Beginning in the 1960's with legislation such as the
Rees-Levering Act of 1966"' and the Moscone Auto Leasing Act of
1969, 7' dozens of. statutes have been enacted which deal directly with
consumer problems.76 All of these statutes were designed to aid the
consumer. In many of the pertinent code sections there is language
authorizing attorney's fees. Generally, fees are not authorized to a
prevailing party; the language limits the award to a prevailing
consumer.
77
The provision for fees to a prevailing party in the Unruh Act,
California Civil Code section 1811.1, is an exception, but is not an
indication of legislative intent to simply shift fees to the winner in a
73. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
This result is possible under any statute permitting fee shifting to a prevailing party, even
under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5, which specifies only that "a court may award attor-
ney's fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties. ... However, the
likelihood of this eventuality will remain small if the other requirements of § 1021.5 are care-
fully adhered to by the courts: there must be a significant benefit conferred on the general
public; there must be a financial burden that makes the award appropriate; and the fees should
not, in the interests of justice, be paid out of the recovery. See McDermott & Rothschild,
supra note 30, at 157.
74. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-2984.4 (West 1974).
75. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2985.7-2990 (West Supp. 1983).
76. See, e.g., Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1747-1748.5
(West Supp. 1983); Consumer Credit Reporting Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1785.1-1785.35
(West Supp. 1983); Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1750-1759 (West
Supp. 1983); Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1790-1796.5 (West.
Supp. 1983).
77. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1747.50, 1747.60, 1747.70 (West 1973).
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contract action."8 This Act governs actions based on consumer retail
installment sales contracts. Use of the term "prevailing party," cou-
pled with the provision that it shall apply whether the action is
brought by the seller, holder or buyer, is simply a recognition of the
fact that actions on contracts are often initiated by the party seeking
to enforce the terms of a contract. 79 The consumer who prevails in
such a suit may well be a prevailing defendant. Thus, the use of the
words "prevailing party" was designed to allow only a prevailing
consumer to recoup his attorney's fees whether he is the plaintiff or
the defendant."0
The California Supreme Court gave judicial support to this in-
terpretation in Morgan v. Reason Corp."1 In that decision, the court
looked to the finding of the Assembly Subcommittee on Lending and
Fiscal Agencies which proposed the Unruh Act." Section 1811.1
was intended "[to] encourage [an] attorney to accept cases when the
buyer has a good defense against an action instituted by the seller or
holder or when the buyer wishes to institute an action for such rights
as he may have."8 3 Clearly, the purpose of this section was to aid the
consumer, not simply to provide for a fee-shifting arrangement re-
gardless of who ultimately prevails.8"
In the same manner, California Civil Code section 1717 ex-
presses this concern for the consumer. Many contracts contain provi-
sions that provide for attorney's fees for a party seeking to enforce
the contract. Because usually only the non-consumer brings suit on a
contract, a literal reading of the contract would award attorney's fees
only to the successful non-consumer. In an attempt to stop this one-
way shifting of attorney's fees, section 1717 provides that in any ac-
tion on a contract containing such a provision, the prevailing party
will be awarded attorney's fees regardless of which party was seek-
ing to enforce the contract.8 5 The scant information available as to
78. Appendix to the Journal of the Assembly (1959 Reg. Sess.), vol. 2, Report of Sub-
committee on Lending and Fiscal Agencies, at 23 [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report].
See also Note, supra note 44.
79. See Note, supra note 44; Comment, Attorney's Fees and Civil Code § 1717, 13 PAc.
L.J. 233 (1981).
80. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
81. 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968).
82. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 78, at 23.
83. Id.
84. 69 Cal. 2d at 896-97, 447 P.2d at 648-49, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
85. Comment, supra note 79, at 236-37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 provides in pertinent
part: [11n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees
and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of that contract, shall be awarded either
to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the
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the legislative intent behind section 1717 indicates that "[t]he bill is
intended to protect persons of limited means who sign contracts with
those in a superior bargaining position.""6
Sections 1811.1 and 1717 and other statutes that provide attor-
ney's's fees to prevailing parties are in accordance with the general
rule that attorney's fees will be provided only to a prevailing con-
sumer. Additionally, even if a statute does not specifically provide for
attorney's fees, they may still be awarded. California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5 permits the award of attorney's fees when-
ever a class action is used to vindicate an important public right.87
Any action to enforce a consumer rights statute usually concerns an
important public right. Therefore, the general rule in California is
that in a consumer class action an award of attorney's fees will usu-
ally be available, but only to the prevailing consumer.
B. California's Class Action Policy
Because of their commitment to consumer rights, the California
legislature and courts are equally committed to the class action de-
vice to protect these rights. Since the 1960's, the courts have shown a
trend toward liberalizing rigid procedural requirements. 8 The stan-
dards for procedural devices have been relaxed so that it is now eas-
ier to comply with class action prerequisites.8 9
In 1967, in Daar v. Yellow Cab Company,9" the California Su-
preme Court issued a ground breaking decision for consumer class
actions in California. Prior to that decision, the courts had strictly
adhered to precedents which required a clearly ascertainable class in
order to maintain a class action.9' The court in Daar distinguished
prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be enti-
tled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1717 (West Supp. 1983).
86. Comment, supra note 79, at n.29 (citing Enrolled Bill Memorandum to then-gover-
nor Reagan, Assembly Bill No. 563, June 5, 1968 (chaptered bill file 68-AB563, California
State Archives)).
87. See supra note 67.
88. NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 1220b.
89. Cotchett, Consumer Class Action 125-27, in CLASS AcTION PRIMER (J. Fuchsberg
ed. 1973).
90. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). In Daar the plaintiffs
alleged that Yellow Cab. Co. had been over-charging its customers during a four year period.
Although all class members and the extent of their claims could not be identified at the outset
of the suit, the court held that they still constituted a sufficiently ascertainable class to be
certified. Id. at 706, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
91. Berk, Daar v. Yellow Cab. Co.: The Advent of the Consumer Class Action in Cali-
fornia, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 651, 654 (1976).
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between an ascertainable class and an identifiable class and permit-
ted the class action to proceed on behalf of thousands of unidentified
consumers. 2 Daar was also the initial step towards judicial adoption
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model for
class action procedures in California. 3
Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County,94 like
Daar, continued to break away from the precedents. In Vasquez, the
California Supreme Court urged use of the Federal model whenever
there was a "hiatus" in the California legislation as to the proce-
dural standards necessary to maintain a class action. 5 Vasquez has
since been the standard by which class action litigation is measured
and is cited routinely in cases and commentary. 6
Subsequent decisions continued the lead of Daar and Vasquez
by upholding more liberal procedural requirements than had the de-
cisions prior to Daar. Cartt v. Superior Court" and Cooper v.
American Savings & Loan Association. 98 for example, addressed
the issue of notice to the large consumer class. Together, these cases
established that in the proper circumstances notice by publication is
an acceptable alternative to individual notice.9
92. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The court held that the
extent of the injuries could be determined from the cab company's records. The identities of
the class members could be determined at a later date when they would be expected to come
forward with proof of their claims.
93. NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 1220b.
94. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). In Vasquez, suit was
brought on behalf of various consumers in San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. The consum-
ers alleged fraudulent business practices by the retailers of freezers and frozen foods. In per-
mitting the class representatives to proceed, the Vasquez court reaffirmed the Daar court's
liberalized policy toward class actions and also allowed the first class action in a suit for con-
sumer fraud.
95. Id. at 821, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
96. See, e.g., City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
117 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1974); Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 374, 127
Cal. Rptr. 579 (1976). See also NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 1220b.
97. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975). This suit alleged that the class
members relied on false advertising by Standard Oil Company in purchasing gas at an inflated
price.
98. 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1976). Plaintiffs complained that the
California savings and loan associations were improperly charging late fees to borrowers on
notes secured with deeds of trust and that clauses in the notes were an invalid restraint on
alienation.
99. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 973, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 389; see also Cooper, 55 Cal. App. 3d at
285, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 590. Additionally, the Los Angeles Superior Court has published the
only manual available in any state for pre-trial procedures in class actions. SUPERIOR COURT
OF Los ANGELES CITY, MANUAL FOR THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL HEARING ON CLASS
ACTIONS ISSUES (1983). In adopting a written manual of procedures, the Los Angeles court
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These developments do not resolve all the issues present in class
action litigation, but they have stimulated liberal use of the class ac-
tion device.' 00 The pre-trial procedural issues are the keys to class
actions because once the parties reach trial, the issues are the same
as in ordinary litigation. California's flexibility at the pre-trial stage
favors class action litigation and demonstrates a policy in favor of the
class action device.' 0'
C. The Effect of Attorney's Fees Awards on California's Consumer
Class Action Policy
The Seibert decision is antithetical to California's policy favor-
ing consumer class actions.' Seibert stands for the proposition that
a prevailing defendant in a class action may be awarded attorney's
fees even in the absence of vexatious, harassing or frivolous conduct
by the plaintiff.'03 The possibility that a class action plaintiff may be
liable for the defendant's legal fees has a stifling effect on consumer
class action litigation and raises several issues regarding implementa-
tion of such an award.
1. Effect on Consumer Litigation
Public interest litigation and public interest law firms have de-
pended on the numerous equitable and statutory exceptions to the
American no-fee rule for their existence and growth.' 0 4 Great gains
were made by taking the financial burden of initiating and maintain-
ing a class action suit off the shoulders of the individual plaintiff.
There is no real relief for the plaintiff, however, if the defendant
prevails and the plaintiff is forced to shoulder the tremendous
financial burden of the opposition's legal fees.
The commentators are in agreement that awards of attorney's
fees to prevailing defendants, absent a showing of bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff, is chilling to consumer litigation.' 5 Awards to
has assured that the potential plaintiff will properly take all steps necessary to maintain a class
action. With written guidelines there is less danger that the class action will fail because it did
not meet the procedural requirements as understood by a particular local court. Thus, the class
action manual recognizes the importance of class action litigation and by clarifying the proce-
dural prerequisites promotes class actions. NEWBERG, supra note 14, at 1220b.
100. NEWBERG, supra note 14, at § 1220b.
101. Cotchett, supra note 89.
102. See supra notes 74-76 and 90-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
104. McDermott & Rothschild, supra note 30, at 138-39.
105. See, e.g., Staff Studies Prepared for the National Institute for Consumer Justice on
Consumer Class Action (1977); Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Mak-
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prevailing defendants have generally not been allowed because it is
against public policy in that it would "diminish whatever deterrent
value the possibility of large exposure to liability might have [on the
non-consumer] ...it turns the deterrent in the consumer, making
him reluctant to bring suit against a corporation with high-powered
legal counsel if he may be required to pay the defendant's costs."' 6
Moreover, equitable considerations advantageous to consumers
are present in consumer class action litigation. When a suit is
brought alleging a violation of a consumer rights statute, the defen-
dant who does not prevail is a violator of California law.10 7 In addi-
tion, whether or not the suit is based on a statutory violation, the
prevailing consumer is vindicating important public policy. Legisla-
tion designed to protect the consumer and to encourage him to de-
fend his rights is of greatly diminished value when the consumer
knows he may be assessed attorney's fees if he attempts to protect his
rights and fails.
2. Problems of Due Process and Notice to the Class
The plaintiffs in Seibert raised issues which made it clear that
some direction must be given to the courts concerning how attorney's
fees are to be awarded and what effect the fees have on class no-
tice.108 The plaintiffs urged that the defendant be required to collect
the fees proportionately from each class member and notify each
class member of the assessed liability.'0° If the court issued such an
order several problems would arise.
First, the due process rights of absent class members may be
violated by assessing fees against absent class members over whom
the court does not have in personam jurisdiction."' Absent class
members are bound by the res judicata effect of the suit only though
use of adequate notice to the class."' This notice must contain infor-
mation sufficient to insure that a potential class member is fully
ing the System Work, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 256 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Making the
System Work]; Aaron, supra note 37; Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 8; Williams, Fee Shift-
ing and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A. J. 859 (1978).
106. Making the System Work, supra note 105, at 258.
107. Although a losing defendant is not found guilty as he would be in a criminal pro-
ceeding, the defendant is nonetheless guilty of a violation of a California statute.
108. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and
Attorney's Fees, Chase v. Ames Mercantile Co., Inc., Civ. No. 628-463 (San Francisco Super.
Ct., Dept. 9, Feb. 13, 1976).
109. Id. at 2, 5-6, D 5.
110. See Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 48-49 (D.C. Iowa 1973).
111. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16 at § 1786.
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aware of his rights and understands what steps must be taken to best
protect his interests.12 In spite of this, absent class members are not
considered to be "parties" to the suit and cannot be asked to share
the costs and expenses of the class representative. 113
Thus, if absent class members can be held liable for the legal
costs of the class opponent, then some mention of this potential lia-
bility will have to be made a part of the initial class notice. As yet,
however, it is not clear what will constitute adequate notice under
these circumstances or even if any notice will be sufficient to over-
come due process objections." 4 In any case, the fears expressed by
the commentators that awarding fees to prevailing defendants will
stifle participation in consumer rights litigation may be realized
when the potential class members get such a notice.
Recent suits brought by various plaintiffs against the major
banks in California"' indicate that this has already become an issue
and a weapon for use by the non-consumer defendant. Among the
various arguments put forth by plaintiffs and defendants as to the
proper content of the notice to consumers were discussions about the
propriety of alerting consumers of their possible liability for legal
costs should the plaintiffs lose in court.1
Second, if the prevailing defendant seeks to obtain payment of
attorney's fees from absent class members he may then be required,
as the plaintiffs in Seibert suggested, to send a second notice to con-
sumers once that award has been made." 7 This creates a new issue
as to the allocation of the cost of the notice. Such a notice may be
viewed as just another of the many costs integral to class action liti-
gation to be borne by the plaintiff or shared between both parties." 8
112. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, at § 1787.
113. Id.
114. This issue has not been discussed in the commentaries. If a dual standard is
adopted in California the issue will become moot. See infra note 120.
115. These suits were brought claiming that the banks had overcharged customers for
overdrafts in violation of the account agreement. The suits have been consolidated in Rudolfi v.
Bank of America, Civ. No. 720-308 (San Francisco Super. Ct., Dept. 3, Sept. 16, 1983).
116. Bank of America's response to Gary Checci's Purported Motion Challenging the
Insufficiency of the Class Notice: "Intention of Counsel to Seek an Award of Costs Against
Absent Class Members in the Event the Class is Unsuccessful in the Litigation Need Not be
Disclosed in the Notice." Id. at p.5 of Defendant's Motion Challenging Insufficiency of Class
Notice.
117. See supra notes 108-09.
118. The problems and arguments over the cost of notice in a class action have in them-
selves been the subject of considerable commentary. For a discussion of how California's ap-
proach to the problem of cost of notice differs from that of the federal courts see Comment,
supra note 13; Comment, The California State Courts and Consumer Class Actions for Anti-
trust Violations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 689 (1982).
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On the other hand, since the prevailing defendant alone stands to
benefit from the notice to class members that they are liable to the
defendant, and because the consumers who fail to prove their claims
are not guilty of any wrongdoing, it may be more equitable to allo-
cate costs of notice solely to the defendant.
3. Assessing Fees to Individual Class Members
If each class member is to pay an equal share of the total fee
award, this would not take into account the unequal burden on class
members with smaller potential claims relative to other class mem-
bers. Moreover, because a class action may involve an unidentified
class, it may not be possible to accurately determine the number of
shares into which the award should be divided. By contrast, if the
award is to be divided in proportion to the relative potential benefit
to each class member, there will be proof problems. Ordinarily,
plaintiffs voluntarily submit their individual claims upon completion
of the suit." 9 If the class loses, absent class members will not volun-
tarily submit any claim once they know they will be assessed liabili-
ties based on the claim.
These are the types of issues raised by the possibility of award-
ing attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a class action. The
court of appeals in Seibert did not address any of these issues, al-
though the plaintiffs brought them to the court's attention. As long
as California does not have a dual standard restricting awards to
prevailing defendants who show bad faith by the plaintiff, questions
of due process, notice, and cost allocation will remain unanswered. If
the California legislature acts to establish a dual standard compara-
ble to that found in the federal courts, these questions will no longer
be necessary. 120
V. PROPOSAL
The legislature must enact a new statute setting forth a stan-
dard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing parties in consumer
class actions. The primary purpose of the legislation should be to
119. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 1786.
120. Some of these same problems will occur when awards are made on the basis of bad
faith litigation on the part of the plaintiff. This is an equitable exception to the no-fee rule,
however, and is intended to punish the errant litigant. WITKIN, supra note 16, at § 116. It
must be presumed that the courts in making such an award will restrict the liability to those
parties who engaged in the punishable conduct and not allow them to spread the burden to
absent class members who are not responsible for the acts which induced the award.
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remove the deterrent effect which now exists because of the possibil-
ity that a losing consumer may be assessed the legal expenses of the
opposing party.12' In addition, by removing the deterrent, an incen-
tive will once again be present for the potential claimant with little
or no money. The consumer and his attorney will be encouraged to
vindicate consumer rights when they can proceed with some expec-
tancy that they may recoup their own legal fees.' 22
To effectuate the goal of promoting consumer rights litigation
through the class actions, a dual standard is needed. A liberal stan-
dard should be applied to prevailing consumers and a more restric-
tive standard applied to prevailing non-consumers. As a model, the
legislature can look to the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Newman 2  and Christiansburg.12" Together, these cases set forth
the federal standard for attorney's fees awards in class actions in
federal courts. The Supreme Court determined that a prevailing con-
sumer should routinely be awarded attorney's fees absent special cir-
cumstances.' 25 On the other hand, a prevailing non-consumer should
be awarded attorney's fees only when there has been a showing of
bad faith by the consumer.'
20
Bad faith, as an exception to the American no-fee rule, has not
yet been judicially accepted in California as it has been in the federal
courts.' 27 The proposed statute should codify the bad faith exception
in class actions. Bad faith litigation should be defined as bringing or
maintaining a frivolous action or an action intended to harass the
opponent, or as conducting litigation in a vexatious manner.' 2
By authorizing fee shifting on a showing of bad faith, the courts
will be relieved of many meritless claims 2 9 ; consumers will be de-
terred from harassing non-consumers with unwarranted suits and
121. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
124. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
125. 390 U.S. at 402.
126. 434 U.S. at 415-22.
127. In the federal courts, attorney's fees are awarded to prevailing parties if there has
been a showing of bad faith on the part of the losing party. California courts have been un-
willing to adopt the bad faith exception under the circumstances that have been presented to
the courts without specific legislative authorization. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
128. Bad faith includes conduct of either party both in initiating and maintaining litiga-
tion that is considered meritless, harassing or vexatious. See Note, supra note 6, at 83-84.
129. There is general agreement among commentators that fee shifting discourages liti-
gation. See, e.g., McDermott & Rothschild, supra note 30, at 154-55; Note, supra note 6, at
76-78. By providing for fee shifting when there is a finding that a suit was meritless, unwar-
ranted class actions are deterred. Id.
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non-consumers will be inhibited from pursuing unreasonable de-
fenses.130 Such bad faith conduct is costly and time consuming to all
the parties and the courts, and statutory recognition of the exception
will prevent it.
To ensure that the consumer is benefited most by this fee shift-
ing provision, use of the terms "consumer" and "non-consumer" is
preferable. Use of the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" or "prevail-
ing party" would require an additional definitional section. A
"plaintiff" or "prevailing party" should be defined to be a consumer
or other person vindicating a consumer right.
Under some circumstances the person advocating the consumer
position may be the defendant."' In such instances attorney's fees to
a prevailing defendant should be made according to the more liberal
standard. If the "prevailing plaintiff' or "prevailing party" is the
non-consumer, then the more restrictive standard should be applied.
Again, use of the terms "consumer" and "non-consumer" would be
simpler and more direct.
Finally, this statute must be made applicable to any consumer
class action. The language must clearly state that when a class action
is brought, this attorney fee provision will take precedence over any
other statutory attorney fee provisions, regardless of the statutory or
non-statutory basis for the suit. Thus, when a class action is brought
under a statute authorizing attorney's fees to a "prevailing party,"
the consumer will be the party intended to be benefited. 132 If the
non-consumer is the prevailing party, this new provision will be
given priority and the prevailing non-consumer will be granted at-
torney's fees only on a showing of bad faith by the consumer.
Enactment of this proposal would correct the deterrent effects
lingering after the decision in Seibert.' A dual standard adopted by
the legislature would eliminate the need for years of litigation on the
issue of attorney's fee awards. Such a legislative step would be in
keeping with the history of consumer rights and class actions in Cal-
ifornia and would benefit the policy of encouraging consumer class
actions."'3
130. These are typical of the kinds of behavior which are defined as bad faith litigation.
Note, supra note 6, at 76-78. Such conduct is believed to be deterred by the award of fees on a
finding of bad faith. Id. at 83-85.
131. Id. at 97 n.107.
132. Fee shifting in class actions is an important means of financing class actions and
encouraging private enforcement of consumer rights. See supra text accompanying notes 104-
106.
133. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
134. See, e.g., Cotchett, supra note 89.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The legislature needs to fill the gap in determining under what
standard attorney's fees awards will be made. Although the standard
for awards to prevailing defendants was determined by the United
States Supreme Court at the federal level in Christiansburg, estab-
lishing such a standard judicially may not be possible or practical in
California. A long time may pass before the issue of attorney's fees
awards to prevailing defendants is brought to the attention of the
California Supreme Court. Indeed, it has already been eight years
since this issue was heard on appeal in Seibert.1"' In the interim, the
stifling effect of the Seibert decision continues in potential class ac-
tions which may never be filed.136
California has had an active legislature in the area of consumer
rights, but this legislative activism may be shrinking due to its failure
to effectuate a determinative and restrictive standard for awards to
prevailing class action defendants. Without the active use of the class
action device, consumer rights legislation loses its effectiveness.
While the individual consumer cannot afford the expense of pursu-
ing his claims, a class action permits individual claimants to join
forces to redress violations of consumer statutes. Yet, the risk of lia-
bility for the enormous legal costs of a high-powered opponent has
its greatest effect before a class action suit actually commences. Class
action plaintiffs and their attorneys must decide at the outset of the
suit if they are willing to take the risk that they may be assessed a
defendant's legal fees even if there is no bad faith on their part.
When the risk is too great, therefore, the suits will not even be filed.
Enactment of the proposed legislation will take this enormous
risk out of consumer rights litigation. Consumer plaintiffs and their
attorneys can safely enforce consumer legislation, and California's
policy encouraging consumer class actions will be furthered.
Marie Celeste Luce
135. Seibert v. Sears, 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233 (decided on January 31,
1975).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 and 104-106.
1984]

